History of Philosophy Hegel

Hegel’s History of Philosophy: Wisdom and Freedom

Jeffrey Reid
University of Ottawa

            Hegel’s thoughts on the history of philosophy can be found mainly in the form of posthumously published notes, either his own sparse lecture notes or, more copiously, from the notebooks of the students who attended the courses he taught on the subject at the University of Berlin between 1820 and 1831, just before his death.   The outline of some of his ideas on the history of philosophy can also be found in his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, in the final sections of Absolute Spirit, where he deals with philosophy itself as the highest human spiritual expression.  One might also argue that fundamental ideas for his history of philosophy are anticipated in his earlier Phenomenology of Spirit (1806), which recounts the epic journey of human thought through time, for it is this journey that provides both the content and the form of Hegel’s account of the subject.
Hegel always began his courses, whether on art, religion, states (world history) or the history of philosophy, with introductory lectures.  His introductions usually dealt with common misconceptions but also with common sense intuitions that turn out to be founded, albeit in ways that go far beyond common sense. Above all, he used his introductions to show how the material presented relates to his notion of Science (Wissenschaft), a term synonymous with his idea of systematic philosophy. I will rely on Hegel’s introductory lectures in order to examine how the history of philosophy is related to his idea of Science, where “love of wisdom” is meant to have become wisdom itself.
The problem is this:  if we believe that the history of philosophy must be undertaken before we can apprehend what true philosophy (as Science) actually is, then we are left in the strange position of studying the history of an object we don’t know.  Conversely, we cannot know what philosophy truly is without having first studied its history, without knowing how it got to be what it is. In other words, only the true, accomplished notion of philosophy puts us in a position to comprehend its history, and yet the true notion of philosophy only appears as a result of that history.  In fact, this apparent paradox is what makes the history of philosophy special, distinguishing it from other histories.  For example, the histories of mathematics, states, art etc., all presuppose the knowledge of their objects. How can we study the history of philosophy without knowing its object? Where do we begin? Well, we begin with the introduction, a rhetorical element that actually introduces us, the reader, the student, into the epistemological circle that I have just described.
Although it may be rhetorical, in Hegel, the introduction is not the arbitrary construction of the author. Rather, it is coherent with his overall approach:  one that assumes that the truth is already known but that we nonetheless must find it out (again) or demonstrate it.  It is a method that echoes Plato’s solution to the Eristic argument:  we must begin with an introduction that presents the truth in a kind of ideal, intuitional way, one that must subsequently be carried out, developed or demonstrated dialectically, in an argued fashion.  Hegel’s introduction to the history of philosophy assumes the true conception of its subject matter, philosophy; it presupposes that it has already been arrived at and has attained a culminating point in Science, where love of wisdom has actually become wisdom.  What is wisdom?  To answer this question, the best I can do is refer to the Socratic command:  know thyself!  For Hegel, as for Socrates (and the Oracle of Delphi), wisdom is ultimately self-knowledge.  Philosophy becomes wisdom (Science) when it knows itself, and it knows itself through the knowledge of its history.  In other words, when philosophy recognizes its history as its own, and recognizes itself in its history, then it is Science. This adds an even deeper dimension to the history of philosophy:  by revisiting that history, we are actually involved in the process of Science; we participate in philosophy’s self-knowledge.
I have just described the end of the history of philosophy, a point where philosophy has recognized itself in its past articulations and sees these as integral to what it is, attaining the wisdom of self-knowledge.  This idea of “the end of history” has been much debated, in Hegel studies, in every area where Hegel method is historical (art, religion, world politics, philosophy) and interpreted in various fashions. Regarding our discussion, it is hopefully enough to state here that, for Hegel, the history of philosophy does indeed end in Hegelian philosophy, which he calls Science.  This is the end of the philosophical narrative.  However, rather than seeing this as typical Germanic folly, one could easily argue that any history implies an end and that this end is nothing other than the point at which the historian chooses to look back and recount his or her story!  In other words, the end of (philosophical) history can be seen as a narrative necessity, providing meaning through the coherency and wholeness of the account. Without such a summing up, without such a sense of achievement, historical accounts, it may be argued, tend to be nothing more than the recounting of an endless series of meaningless, boring events.
The principle interest in the history of philosophy involves the connection between past events and the present stage of philosophical reflection.  But what are such philosophical “events”?  Who are the protagonists of this history?  Hegel calls them “heroes of thought”.  By the power of their reason, they have “penetrated into the being of things, of nature, of spirit, of God, providing treasures of thought”, for us, students of that history, who will come to recognize ourselves, as philosophers, in that history.  The so-called “events” of such a history do not take place in the physical world but rather in thought itself, in the realm of universal concerns. This means that the less attention history of philosophy pays to the personal, particular aspects of the philosopher’s life, the better.  What matters is the philosopher’s thought, not his personal idiosyncrasies. The past “acts of thought” that we reflect upon may appear, at first, foreign to us, things of the past, but “in reality, we are what we are through history”.  Our awareness of this is what Hegel calls “the possession of self-conscious reason”.
This process is not unique to us, in the present, but has taken place in every “present”, i.e. every past philosopher has taken the material (of thought) that has been passed on, has re-thought it, and made it his/her own. In doing so, past philosophical knowledge has been constantly reworked, transformed, preserved and yet invested with the spirit of those reflecting upon it. Thus, philosophy can be seen to “rise in relation to previous philosophy”, in a way that bespeaks progress. Such progress should not be seen as strictly linear but rather, to use Hegel’s strong metaphor, it is a story that “swells like a river, the farther it gets from its source”, incorporating the philosophical contributions of all those who, in the past, have reflected on “their” history and so invested it with the spirit of their time.
As historians of philosophy, the “events” we have before us are human philosophical systems, produced by human spirit. On another level, however, the history we have before us is that of thought itself, what Hegel calls the Idea or the Absolute, which becomes real and comes to recognize itself through its own articulations in time. I will return to this absolute dimension below.  For now, the Hegelian Idea is best comprehended in Neo-Platonic terms, where Plato’s highest Form or Idea (the Good) becomes immanent in the world, giving rise to the human desire to know its source.  In Hegel, the temporal nature of the process is where humanity is involved, through the history of philosophy.  As we’ve seen, however, the end of this history implies an absolute dimension in the wisdom of Science.
The dynamic encounter between the absolute aspect of what Hegel calls Science, as the whole, fully recognized Truth, and the temporal immanence of human philosophical endeavor is problematic.  The Truth, as absolute must be eternally present. Otherwise, it would not be the Truth.  However, as such, how can it have a history?  What is the relation between the history of the truth and the Truth itself?  Furthermore, if the Truth is the fully developed whole, what is the truth status of its parts, of the “events” that make up the history of philosophy? Are they errors? If so, how can the whole Truth be made up of errors?  What is the relation between the whole Truth and the particular fields human thought, for example, the sciences and religion? These are the questions Hegel deals with in his Introduction to the history of philosophy.

a) How the History of Philosophy is related to the Truth
The apparent contradiction between the Truth as eternal and history as transitory, changing and therefore untrue implies that philosophy, as historical, cannot gain its object, Truth.  This problem appears to be reflected in the history of philosophy itself. Whereas other sciences seem to progress calmly, gradually gaining truth and expanding knowledge, philosophy seems to undergo constant upheaval, where earlier contributions are contradicted and dismissed. Thus, a common idea regarding the history of philosophy is that it is only an accumulation of opposed opinions. Just as world history seems to recount a series of contingent actions, across time, the history of philosophy is seen to recount contingent thoughts (not actions) called opinions.  Philosophy becomes a series of senseless follies, or, at best, culturally useful information that can be possessed as helpful erudition.  For Hegel, the fact that this tends to be our contemporary view of the matter is a reflection of the current climate of opinion in which we live. Our opinionated world sees itself in the history of philosophy:  a vast multitude of opinions, spread out for our choosing.
Hegel’s Lectures (on Art, Religion, the State, Philosophy) are full of critical asides levelled against a contemporary culture which seems opposed to his own view of Science. Such criticism is enough to refute the uninformed view that Hegel saw himself living in a world where his own philosophy, as an “end”, was thoroughly actualized in reality. I have tried to stress the narrative (or logical) requirements of such a culmination, as inherent in how historical accounts are generally understood. Affirming that the world has actually ended with Hegelian philosophy is another matter entirely.
If the culture of opinion is the climate for beginning a discussion of the history of philosophy, the result will be the finding out of particular, isolated ideas that appear foreign to me because they are not mine.  The history of philosophy will simply subject me to a mass of strange opinions. This view runs counter to the essence of that history:  the free movement of thought in which I may recognize myself as thinking and free. As historians of philosophy, and thus as philosophers, we must follow this past movement, working it out for ourselves, making it truly our own. There are no shortcuts, in spite of the spurious promises of our current culture of opinion.
Common opinion does not recognize the philosophical process, and indeed, the events of the history of philosophy seem to challenge this view.  Just as history per se can be seen as the thankless rise and fall of individuals and civilizations, the history of philosophy can similarly be seen as an endless, meaningless account of “the dead burying their dead”, a “battlefield covered with the bones of the dead”, where each new philosophy is presented as the right one, consigning others to the graveyard.   On this view, each philosopher builds and creates his new system, one that shows all previous attempts to be wrong. However, as Hegel argues in the Introduction to his Phenomenology of Spirit, a system of philosophy that is absolutely True cannot leave anything out; otherwise it would not be absolute.  Even “error” must be included in such a system.  In fact, it is these past “errors” that are historically incorporated into the holistic view of philosophy that Hegel calls Science.  Consequently, the history of philosophy is integral to the Truth.  If indeed “the Truth is One”, it is because the systematic One incorporates diversity rather than excluding it. The diversity and number of past philosophies do not refute philosophy. Rather, the diversity is its own history, through which it is what it is. 
This means that the different philosophies of the past are not “a collection of chance events” that are disconnected.  Rather, “in the movement of the thinking spirit, there is real connection and what there takes place is rational.”  The term “rational” is much misunderstood, in Hegel. It does not mean that history (in general) runs on some kind of occult, pre-determining, dialectical program, designed by a transcendent “software” designer.  “Rational” describes a relation wherein thought has come to recognize itself in otherness, precisely because it has thought through that otherness.  In the case of history, “rational” means that thought has come to recognize itself in what was initially historical otherness. 
Because thought, for Hegel, is characterized by movement, a movement that he calls the Concept, history (of philosophy), as rational, will follow the movement of the concept.  This movement is not linear and never-ending, but rather can be seen as a development that is circular, and deepening, like a spiral, where the endpoint is already pre-conceived intuitively at the beginning. The development between beginning and end must be seen as one of enrichment, of struggle, and above all, as free.  To get the point across, Hegel, in his Introduction, refers to Aristotle, through the terms of potentiality and actuality, and metaphorically to the development of the seed into the actual tree. This development is driven by the final, actual form and yet the final form was already there, at the start, in the potential of the seed. In the present context, the movement of philosophical history is driven by its final form, as Science, and yet this destiny must already be present at the beginning, as an intuition of the achieved whole, the wisdom of philosophical self-knowledge.  Hegel calls the protagonist of this odyssey “spirit”, a technical term for what I referred to above as “human thought”.  
Referring to the metaphor of the tree, we can say that the history of human spirit, recounted in the history of philosophy, is not a system of external, mechanistic necessity but a system carrying out its own potential, its own necessity, which thus constitutes its freedom. Philosophy is therefore a system in development, and that development is its history.  Just as the development of the tree may appear as an accidental process, where branches and twigs seem to grow at random, the stages of historical development, when looked back upon, are rational, because it is our thought that is revisiting and reflecting upon the process. The end is the self-knowlege of spirit, which is presupposed as absolute Truth, one that must already be eternally there, otherwise it would not be True, in the same way the tree was present in the seed. We must see this voyage of self-discovery as the development of freedom, where freedom is essentially the self-movement of human spirit, realizing itself and recognizing itself through otherness.
In this way, the “errors” of the past become the actual content of philosophical Science as a whole. If past philosophies have passed away, it is not because they are wrong, but rather because they are incomplete. Philosophy is only complete, as Science, when form is adequate to content, where the form embraces all past forms as its content. In Science, all past forms are preserved as present content, affirmatively contained as elements in an organic whole. As preserved, each past philosophy has only surrendered its pretention to be final and absolute.
On the other hand, each past philosophy must be taken as the full expression of its particular “present” within spirit (in the progress of humanity).  For example, Cartesian philosophy is the full and adequate expression of a mechanistic view of nature, current at the time of Descartes.  However, his philosophy is insufficient to fully explain later organic chemistry. In a way, we can say that the history of philosophy does not deal with the past but with moments that have been present. The content of philosophy is always “true” with respect to its moment in time, its moment in spirit, and yet is an “error” or incomplete with regards to the whole of Science.  Consequently, we must not regard the history of philosophy as simply dealing with the past.  “In time, it is always true and for every time”, as Hegel remarks.  Our project, as historians of philosophy (i.e. as philosophers) is to rediscover the “presence” in the past forms.  In doing so, we make those forms “for us” or to put it another way, we ourselves become present in those past forms.  Consequently, reason in history, defined as thought’s recognition of itself in (historical) otherness, implies that the history of philosophy ultimately does not deal with what is gone, but with the living present.
Each philosopher has his place in time. History of philosophy has mainly to do with finding this place or rather the time, the moment in spirit, in the progress of humanity.  This method is a sign of maturity.  As with individuals, it is a mistake to try to relive one’s youth or one’s childhood.  Rather, the mature individual looks back on the different stages of his life, grasps each in its place, while both recognizing himself in these past moments and recognizing this past as constituting the person he has become. This is the process Hegel calls “remembering” (Erinnerung).  It does not mean yearning nostalgically for past forms because they are “simpler”, more natural etc.  Such nostalgic yearning for simplicity is a sign of escapism and impotence. Hegel is opposed to the romantic idea of the past, presaged by Rousseau, developed in Herder, where history is seen as a kind of falling away or decadence from an original state that was somehow truer and better because it was closer to nature.  Against this trend, Hegel maintains that the earliest forms of philosophy are, in fact, the poorest, the most abstract. Conversely, the latest philosophical forms are the most concrete, precisely because they have taken earlier forms into account. 

b)  How Philosophy is Related to the Spirit of its Time
If we take spirit as the movement of human thought through time, and we accept that philosophy is the highest manifestation of thought, then philosophy must have an essential bond with the spirit of its time.  We might then ask how philosophy arises within a given culture, at a certain time. For example, it is usually said that philosophy arises when physical conditions of ease and luxury allow people to think beyond their immediate needs.  However, for Hegel, the idea that physical conditions influence spiritual (or mental) manifestations is wrong-headed. In fact, the opposite is true.  Because spirit, in general, is the process of thought overcoming, determining and negating nature, it is rather the universe of physical occurrence that is conditioned by philosophy!  For example, it is the subjective idealism of Cartesian philosophy that determines its world as mechanical, and devoid of spontaneous animation.
Given that philosophy, as the highest articulation of thought, embodies the overcoming of natural life and liberation from natural determination, the consequence is that a culture’s philosophy actually manifests itself when its original “robustness of life” is in a state of decline.  In fact, philosophy (as thought) brings about the decline!  Philosophy shakes up and even destroys status quo reality. Hence, the best philosophy accompanies the downfall of civilizations or, as Hegel puts it elsewhere, the owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk.  As examples, Hegel cites Socrates and Plato, whose philosophies arose in the period of Athenian decadence, when Athens was past its prime, its freshness and youthful vitality gone.  Roman philosophy (Stoicism, Epicureanism) similarly appears with the decadence of Rome, and the zenith of ancient philosophy appears with the Neo-Platonists at Alexandria.  Similarly, modern philosophy (Descartes, Hobbes et al) occurs with the opposition of Church and State, and the fall of the Holy Roman Empire.

c) How Philosophy is Distinct from Other Ways of Knowing the Truth: Freedom
Philosophy is the love of wisdom. In Hegel, wisdom is the self-knowledge of spirit, its absolute Truth. However, philosophy is not the only form of human thought that seeks Truth.  What makes philosophy the highest form of spirit, that which Hegel calls absolute spirit?  What guarantees philosophy its absolute status and distinguishes it from the other sciences, and from mythology and religion?
Regarding the other sciences, e.g. the sciences of nature, anthropology, psychology, economics etc., while they certainly seek the truth within their domains, they lack the essential aspect of freedom that philosophy expresses in its progressive movement.  The individual sciences are simply anchored in the consciousness of a specific time and culture, without being aware of this specificity.  Furthermore, they remain empirically attached to their presupposed object (the earth, man, mind, numbers etc.), confined to studying its finite detail. In opposition to this view, Hegel refers to Spinoza, who affirms that philosophy may deal with finite things but only “as resting in the divine Idea”, i.e. in the eternal, whole Truth that philosophy presupposes in the wisdom toward which it moves.
Given the universal, absolute underpinning of true philosophy, however, we must then enquire into its difference from religion.  Given what we have seen regarding the absolute vocation of philosophy as systematic Science, we cannot merely exclude religion as that which is opposed to it, for then Science would not be absolutely True!  In fact, the exclusion of religion reflects the strict Enlightenment view, one which we have largely adopted today, along with an empirical culture similar to the one Hegel attributes to England.  The difference between philosophy and religion is far more nuanced in that they both seek to know, in their own ways, the infinite.  Nonetheless, from a historical point of view, it is true that philosophy has distinguished itself from religion over time.  Indeed, the very conditions for the beginning of philosophy certainly involve opposition to previously existing religion.
In religion, the infinite is experienced as a Beyond, as the Other which is reconciled with man through worship. As the immediate recognition of the unity of God and man, worship should be taken as an expression of Reason:  the self-recognition of thought in otherness.  However, in religion, such recognition is expressed as a “representation”, i.e. as the image of the human God and the godly human: Christ, the object of an immediate form of knowing called faith, the foundation of worship.  Philosophy shares the same goal as religion:  Reason.  However, whereas in religion worship takes place in the form of representations, as doctrines and images, in philosophy the reconciliation of the infinite and the human takes place through the philosophical language of thought itself.  It is nonetheless a fundamental mistake to think of religion as devoid of thought. 
In their eastern origins, in the Church Fathers, in Scholastic philosophy, we find religion and philosophy mixed together.  Historically, theology (science of religion) is an expression of this uneasy admixture.  Given this ambiguously shared past, the question becomes, to what extent should the history of philosophy take past forms of religious thinking into account? 
If human self-knowledge, as spirit, can be articulated, in religious terms, as the knowledge of God, then we see how, for Hegel, the process of spirit itself is, on one level, divine. This is what Hegel means when he remarks that, “the active subjective spirit is that which comprehends the divine and in its comprehension of it is itself the divine spirit.”
I am not trying to portray Hegel as promoting religion beyond its station. While religion and philosophy share the same object, i.e. the Truth or absolute knowing, religion remains anchored in its representations and images while philosophy takes place in the realm of pure, speculative thought. To put it simply, philosophy thinks over religion (and produces philosophy of religion) whereas religion cannot properly think philosophy. “Thinking over” religion allows philosophy to not only recognize it as the penultimate expression of human spirit but also, more importantly, to recognize itself in religion, the same way it must recognize itself in its own history. This is how we come to see that religion is not completely alien to philosophy.  Without such acknowledgement, Hegel rightly sees, religion tends to degenerate into fanatical, thoughtless fundamentalism.
Although philosophy recognizes religion as having a shared goal, it is crucial to note that the representative, symbolic nature of religious discourse does not allow it to be historical. The “eternal” aspect in religion is never more than an ever-present Revelation. In fact, if religion were itself historical, it would be the free self-movement of thought, i.e. it would be philosophy.  Consequently, when religion claims a history, it becomes something else:  mythology.  Hegel must therefore distinguish mythology from philosophy, an increasingly pressing task given the on-going efforts of his old friend (and rival) Schelling, whose work seems to be moving toward a position where philosophy itself is taken as the ultimate, rational form of mythology!
Mythology, for Hegel, reflects only the external aspect of religion, and therefore appears to have some sort of historical movement, through epochs, involving different myths: oriental, Greek, Roman, Christian.  However, while mythologies may seem to evolve historically, in fact they are always anchored in artistic symbolism, which is essentially non-historical. Indeed, the nature of symbolism means that the religious “Beyond” is always immediately incarnate in the finite expressions of art that mythology employs.  By putting aside the mythological, symbolic aspect of religion, we put aside any historical elements it may appear to have and thus remove religion, as knowledge of the Absolute, entirely from the history of philosophy.  When religion is allowed a history, in Hegel, it always involves art, i.e. its external mythological dimension. 

d) The Beginning of Philosophy and the Progress of Freedom
We have distinguished philosophy from the other human truth-seeking endeavors, i.e. from the sciences, from religion and mythology. In all of these contexts, philosophy distinguished itself by the freedom of its thinking activity. As we saw, the sciences remain bonded to their specific time and place, unconscious of the metaphysical presuppositions that they are grounded upon.  Religion is bound to the representative nature of its accounts, to the rich artistic articulations of its images and stories. Perhaps we can also say that religion is bound to the Truth through the immediacy of faith.  The essential freedom of philosophy, as the highest (most “divine”) human pursuit, allows us to see how it comes into time, and thus becomes historical.
The birth of philosophy must take place at a time when there is human consciousness of freedom through the notions of independent individuality, personhood and political freedom.  In other words, philosophical freedom (of thought) must be expressed as practical (i.e. moral and political) freedom.  This awakening of human consciousness to (its own) freedom first takes place in the Greek world.  It does so, on Hegel’s reading, in opposition to what he calls the “oriental” conception of human moral/political existence.  The eastern world is generally portrayed as a type of deterministic substance or nature wherein the finite is seen as purely arbitrary and evanescent. The ontological status of this natural world ensures the meaninglessness of the individual, whose final destiny is nothing other than dissolution into the universal substance.  Although this apparent lack of freedom excludes eastern philosophy from the history of philosophy as Hegel conceives it, i.e. as the development of human freedom, his lectures, after 1819, do show an increasing interest in what he refers to as oriental thought:  Chinese, Egyptian, Indian and Persian philosophy.
In Greek culture the individual liberates himself from eastern heteronomy, playing out, historically, the famous master/slave struggle that Hegel outlines in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  Accordingly, the free Greek subject does not sink into the natural world but rather endures in it, aware of himself as universal to the extent that he knows himself as mind, and therefore as free. For to know oneself as mind, as inherently universal, is to be free.  Thus the Greek self is no longer a mere “being in nature”; he stands against natural determination and this is the birth of philosophy. Philosophy, as self-conscious mind or spirit, begins in Ancient Greece or, to put this more bluntly, “the eastern form must be excluded from the history of philosophy”.
However, Greek freedom, as we know, is conditioned by slavery.  In other words, as long as some are held in slavery, no one can be truly free.  The possibility of true human freedom is only developed in the Christian era, where, for Hegel, modernity begins.  Free selfhood does not begin with Descartes but with the idea of the individual as unconditionally free to choose salvation or damnation, along with the idea that such essential human freedom flows from God’s own absolute freedom.  Philosophy, as the highest expression of human spirit (and freedom) is therefore divided into two main areas:  Greek and Modern (which Hegel calls “Teutonic”, see below), corresponding to Ancient and Modern views of freedom.
The Greek world is divided into three sub-periods, depending on the relation of freedom existing between the self and the world.  The Pre-Socratics are still concerned with the universality of nature as such.  Consequently, they develop principles that hold the ambiguous status of being both natural and spiritual (e.g. fire for Heraclitus). Indeed, originating on the West Coast of Ionia, the Pre-Socratics are almost “the east”.
The second stage of Greek philosophy occurs in Anaxagoras and Socrates, where the self is developed to the point of embracing thought as its universal activity.  This recognition of the freedom of thought is almost modern.  What is missing from the universality of thought, however, is its deep inner, individual resonance that Christianity will bring.  Still, the individual figure of Socrates (like Antigone) cannot help but be seen as a manifestation of modern particular freedom against earlier substantive forms.
In the third stage of Greek philosophy, the awkward, artificial unity between the particular and the universal, embodied in the hybrid nature of Aristotle’s system of metaphysical empiricism, breaks down into two opposed, mutually exclusive positions of Roman philosophy:  the universality of reason implied by Stoicism, and the materialistic particularity of Epicureanism.
The final stage of Greek (i.e. ancient) philosophy involves the resolution of this difference, either through the annihilation of all difference in scepticism or the (re)integration of the particular and the universal in Neo-Platonism, the highest form of Greek philosophy.  In Neo-Platonism, we recognize the union of identity and difference. In this way, it pre-figures the highest expression of philosophy itself, the goal and purpose of Hegelian philosophy: absolute knowing or Science. We are still lacking, however, the freedom of subjective individuality, made possible in the Christian world.
The duality of Stoicism and Epicureanism is replayed in the modern dichotomy between deterministic reason and faith.  This duality, besides producing a new, modern form of scepticism, prefigures the possibility of Science:  Neo-Platonism reborn but now with individual freedom, qua subjectivity. Teutonic (modern) philosophy involves a formative period of opposition (the Middle Ages, where faith and reason stand absolutely opposed), and what is usually called the modern period.  Here, initially, the confrontation between faith and reason takes the form of an opposition between Cartesian selfhood and Baconian empiricism, reconciled in the writings of the German, Neo-Platonic theosopher, Jakob Böhme.  The ultimate form of modern (16th and 17th Century) philosophy is neither French nor English butTeutonic!
Of course Hegel’s history of philosophy does not end here. The same dilemma that characterized the duality of Stoicism and Epicureanism, i.e. the opposition between substance and the subjective demands of individual personality, and which we saw played out, on a deeper level, in modern philosophy (between empiricism and rationalism) will again restate itself in more recent times.  Indeed, the challenge of Hegel’s own era restates the same opposition in terms of Enlightenment reason (Spinozistic determinism) and Kantian subjective criticism. Once again, the solution is presented as the reconciliation of these two tendencies, pre-figured in Neo-Platonism and in Jakob Böhme’s mysticism:  Hegelian Science.  If this “last” philosophy does not figure in Hegel’s own historical account, it is because we are meant to have already become acquainted with it through its history, now our history.