The first year of war, 1914-1915

In Russia and elsewhere across Europe, the declaration of war was, greeted with a surge of patriotic enthusiasm. By 1917 war would prove to be the undoing of Tsardom, but in 1914 the outbreak of hostilities greatly enhanced the Tsar’s position. Huge crowds gathered at the Winter Palace in St Petersburg and sang hymns; the crowds were even larger in Moscow. The French ambassador, observing such scenes, remarked, “To those thousands the Tsar really is the autocrat, the absolute master of their bodies and souls”. The Duma politicians, save 5 Bolshevik representatives, were united in unconditional support for the war effort. Strikes almost ceased and mobilisation went smoothly. All were united in the desire to beat the Germans, and with British and French help this was thought to be possible. Moreover, most thought the war would be short.

Enthusiasm for the war lasted about six months or so. Initially, the Imperial army - the 'Russian steamroller' as it was known in the West - moved swiftly into East Prussia but soon suffered large-scale defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. However, these were offset by success against the Austrians in Galicia, which was overrun. At the end of 1914 honours were even, but the extent of Russian casualties was considerable and the shortage of munitions showed up the inadequacies of the war effort. Six and a half million men had been mobilised by November, but they were issued with only 4.6 million rifles. The front stabilised until the spring of 1915.

If the first six months of the war had been barely satisfactory, then the next six were disastrous. A combined Austro-German offensive pushed the Russians out of Galicia and a major German attack along the rest of the line pushed them back 200-300 miles, with the loss of Poland, Lithuania and even parts of the Ukraine. After a year, Russian casualties were approaching a staggering 4 million killed, wounded, captured or missing. Polivanov, the Minister for War, perceptively observed that 'one should not forget that the army now is quite different from the one which marched forth at the beginning of the war'. Most of the officers were dead, as were the infantry and reserves: the army was no longer the loyal one of 1914.

Nicholas blesses the troops before battle

 

The mood which had been enthusiastic at the beginning of the war changed drastically by the spring. in Russia the lack of shells and rifles created a political crisis fuelled by critical press reports and personal jealousies. The government was charged with incompetence and anyone with any responsibility usually blamed somebody else. In no other country was the war effort so undermined internally. 'By June 1915, the spirit of common purpose that had united the government and opposition. . . vanished, yielding to recriminations and hostility even more intense than the mood of 1904-5' (Richard Pipes). However, criticism in 1915 was mainly confined to the middle classes who had, in their turn, been the most enthusiastic group for the war in the first place.
Nicholas responded with a ministerial shake-up in June. In addition, the Tsar conceded the principle of cooperation, with the establishment of joint boards - committees consisting of government officials, private businessmen and Duma deputies - to deal with military shortages. The significance of these organisations was more political than economic. They were seen as a sort of parallel bureaucracy and were considered to be more efficient than the government one.
Although the important principle of cooperation with the educated elite was conceded with regard to the war effort, Nicholas would not make comparable political concessions. Indeed at this time of crisis he made two significant decisions that were to have a detrimental effect in the long-term:

He decided to become Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces at the front

 

He rejected the overtures of the 'Progressive Bloc' to form a Duma- based cabinet. In other words, a government  that had public support.

 

 

Nicholas as Commander-in-Chief

There were good reasons why Nicholas should take over as Commander-in-Chief. The Grand Duke Nicholas, was in a state of panic and his generals were incompetent; the Tsar would be a more calming influence and his Chief-of-Staff, General Alekseev, who would decide strategy and operations, had some ability. In addition, many peasant soldiers still revered their Tsar and there was some hope that morale would improve. Another consideration was that it prevented the military from colluding with the opposition at Nicholas's expense. Nicholas himself saw it as a necessary act of duty and patriotism. He left for the front on 22 August.
On the other hand, the Council of Ministers were horrified. They felt Nicholas would be held responsible for every reverse; but as it happened the front stabilised in the autumn as the Germans ran out of steam. However, the absence of the Tsar from the home front did have unfortunate consequences in the capital where the unpopular Tsarina, Alexandra, interfered with government, often at the behest of Rasputin. In addition, the opportunity to create a broad-based government was missed.

The 'Progressive Bloc', a combination of Kadets, Octobrists and Progressists in the Duma,  came into being in the summer of 1915. It had the support of some government ministers, much of the press and two important organisations - the Town Union and the Zemstvo Union - that had been created in August 1914 to help the war effort. The Bloc also appeared to have middle-class support in Moscow and the provinces. It represented an attempt to create a partnership in government with wide support, an attempt to create a 'National Government' - a ministry of public confidence. On 21 August most ministers requested that Nicholas let the Duma form a government. Nicholas was unmoved; he was determined not to make the mistake he believed he had made in October 1905. He would not surrender any power, he would not compromise. Indeed he even decided to dismiss the Duma (which he did on 3 September). His response was greeted with disbelief. It isolated

him from virtually all the educated classes. To ignore even conservatives was indeed short-sighted. But there was little the politicians could do; they did not want a revolution. However, as the front stabilised, the crisis abated. In the nine months that followed, Nicholas's firmness seemed to be vindicated.

 

1916

Brusilov's success inspired the Romanians to join the war on the Allied side but they were soon overrun and their participation only succeeded in extending Russia's front line to the Black Sea. Despite suffering half a million casualties in this offensive, Russia's military performance in 1916 was quite encouraging.

The home front

Just as the front line was at its strongest, the home front began to crack. Whereas in 1915 it had been the educated classes which had become disaffected, in 1916 they were joined by all urban dwellers, but particularly the proletariat. The causes were primarily economic - shortage of food and fuel, and high prices - but the fusion of urban mass discontent with that of the liberal politicians (as in October 1905), proved to be a dangerous political cocktail. It completely unnerved many members of the establishment who now came to so fear revolution that they too demanded political change - and when that was not forthcoming, came to consider the removal of the Tsar himself.

 

Inflation was not initially a problem in Russia but prices began to rise at the end of 1915 and then more than doubled in 1916. This benefited the peasantry who could command high prices for their grain and high wages for labour (which was scarce because of conscription). In the autumn of 1916 the Department of Police reported that rural areas were 'contented and calm'. A succession of good harvests also meant there was plenty of surplus grain to sell. The situation in the cities, however, was not good, and inflation and shortages of food and fuel became acute in 1916. The urban population is estimated to have grown from 22 million to 28 million between 1914 and 1916. Wages could not keep pace with prices; in October 1916 the Police estimated that wages had risen 100 per cent in the past two years, but prices had gone up by 300 per cent. Everyone was affected and the Department of Police warned that great danger existed of a popular explosion brought on by collapsing living standards. 'The ordinary inhabitant [is] condemned to a half-starved existence.' The head of police added that the government, including the Emperor himself, was held to blame. Most observers agreed that a crisis was looming.

What were the reasons for this crisis? There were three:

The collapse of the rail network

The requirements of the army

The hoarding of grain by the peasants.

 

There was no shortage of grain, it was simply not getting to the towns. The rail network was in a state of serious deterioration (it had not been very good to begin with), the rolling stock was worn out, repairs were not being made, and the same applied to the railroad itself which was often single track. The retreat had also led to the loss of one of the two main north-south lines. The peasants began hoarding grain when it got to the point that there was nothing to buy (or what there was, was too expensive); there was no incentive to sell if there were no farming tools or consumer goods available. These were not being made as industry was concentrating on armament production.
The Tsar was aware of the crisis on the home front but bewildered as to how to resolve it. He had become, by the autumn of 1916, a shadow of his former self (which many would say was not much).

His Majesty is a changed man. . . He is no longer seriously interested in anything. Of late, he has become quite apathetic. He goes through his daily routine like an automaton, paying more attention to the hour set for his meals or his walk in the garden, than to affairs of state. One can't rule an empire and command an army in the field in this mannet: If he doesn't realise it in time, something catastrophic is bound to happen.
Paul Benckendorff, the Grand Marshal of the Court; quoted in Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II (John Murray, 1993)
Back in Petrograd (as St Petersburg was renamed at the beginning of the war), the Tsar's absence left a great deal of power in the hands of the Tsarina Alexandra. Because she was German she was an easy target for rumours of treachery. She knew little about policies and concentrated more on personalities. Alexandra was also influenced by Rasputin, who now began to have some say in appointments and policies, a factor which became well known in Petrograd. Regardless of his actual influence, popular perception believed it to be considerable; the fact that the Imperial couple could be swayed by an ignorant, debauched peasant did little for the monarchy's prestige. Alexandra encouraged Nicholas to change ministers with such frequency that the process became known as 'ministerial leapfrog'. Anyone who showed some independence of mind was replaced by someone whom the Empress and Rasputin liked - someone who would be loyal, obedient and unquestioning. These changes not only weakened the government but administrative continuity as well (in fact between August 1915 and February 1917 13 major ministries saw 36 ministers come and go). Together with the Tsar's apathy,

all this meant that the civilian government was in many ways leaderless, in a state of drift. A vacuum was developing.

In the winter of 1916-17 enormous pressure built up on Nicholas II to concede a government which would be chosen from the Duma. When in September 1916 Nicholas had appointed the deputy chairman of the Duma, Alexander Protopopov, as Minister of the Interior, it aroused great hopes of a responsible ministry, but it was not to be. In fact, Protopopov turned out to be something of a disaster and seriously undermined the effectiveness of a crucial ministry at a critical time.
Conservatives, and even members of the royal family, now warned Nicholas of impending revolution and begged him to make concessions.

Literally everyone is worried... about Russia's internal condition. They say straight out that if matters go on as now within Russia we will never succeed in winning the war. . . the universal cry is for. . . the establishing of a responsible ministry: This measure is considered to be the only one which could avoid a general catastrophe.
The Grand Duke George writing in November 1916; quoted in Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II, (John Murray; 1993)
Nicholas did not respond. Many now came to see him as an obstacle to victory and a guarantee of revolution. For the first time liberals and monarchists made common cause against the crown. The oppositional mood even spread to the generals - General Krymov told Rodzianko, the chairman of the Duma, that the army would welcome a coup d'etat. Even the murder of Rasputin in December - undertaken by members of the aristocracy in a desperate attempt to reduce the damage being inflicted on the monarchy - could not reverse the Tsar's growing isolation. Although Nicholas appeared to no longer have the will to stand firm, he still failed to respond constructively to any suggestions. As 1916 drew to a close, the political situation was serious. The extreme left wanted a revolution; the liberals wanted constitutional government and many on the right simply wished to replace Nicholas. Indeed a number of conspiracies were afoot to that end but they were not successful at this time. The Tsar was a man out of his depth.

 

TASKS

The first year of war

1. What evidence was there in 1914 to suggest that the Tsar’s decision to go to war was a popular one?
2. How long did this enthusiasm last?
3. What was the ‘Russian steamroller’? What were its strengths and weaknesses?
4. Which countries did the Russian Empire lose possession of in the first year of war?
5. Why did Polivanov believe, “.. the army now is quite different from the one which marched forth at the beginning of the war”?
6. What does Pipes claim happened to the war effort in Russia?
7. Which group were the biggest critics of the government in 1915?
8. What changes did Nicholas implement as a result of growing opposition?
9. Why do you think Nicholas refused to make political concessions?
10. What two decisions did Nicholas make at this time

 

 

Nicholas as Commander-in-Chief

1. List the good and bad points about Nicholas’ role as Commander-in-Chief.
2. What was the Progressive Bloc? When was it formed?
3. What were the aims of the Progressive Bloc?
4. What did Nicholas do on 3 September and how did this decision weaken his position?

 

 

1916

1. How had the Russian army improved by 1916?
2. What was the Brusilov Offensive?

 

 

The home front

1. Why was the peasantry content in 1916?
2. What problems were being experienced in the cities?
3. What were the three reasons for this crisis?
4. Why were peasants hoarding grain?
5. What do Benckendorff’s comments reveal about Nicholas’ state of mind in late 1916?
6. Give two reasons why Alexandra was often criticised.
7. What did the term ‘ministerial leapfrog’ refer to?
8. What decision was Nicholas encouraged to make in the winter of 1916-1917? Did Nicholas concede?
9. What was unusual about the opposition to Nicholas at this time?
10. What is a ‘coup d’etat’? Which group supported such a move?